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bstract: Do we owe it to future generations, as a require-
ment of justice, to take action to mitigate anthropogenic 
climate change? This paper examines the implications of 
Derek Parfit’s notorious non-identity problem for that question. An 
argument from Jörg Tremmel that the non-identity effect of climate 
policy is “insignificant” is examined and found wanting, and a con-
trastive, difference-making approach for comparing different choices’ 
non-identity effects is developed. Using the approach, it is argued that 
the non-identity effect of a given policy response to climate change 
depends on the contrasting policy. Compared to a baseline scenario 
without further mitigation, the non-identity effect of choosing to limit 
climate change to 1.5°C would be highly significant. 
Keywords: Climate change, Non-identity problem, Intergener-
ational justice
Introduction
Many of the questions we confront today have profound implica-
tions for the lives and living conditions of future people. Should 
we reduce carbon emissions? Conserve resources? Pay down the 
national debt? Curb population growth? Whatever the case may 
be, it’s hard to believe that we could respectably address such is-
sues without paying some attention to interests of future people.
And yet, when we think about justice for future generations, we 
run up immediately against Parfit’s (1984) notorious non-identity 
problem. In this paper, I take a fresh look at the problem’s impli-
cations (or lack thereof ) for policy responses to anthropogenic 
climate change. Recently, Tremmel (2018) has argued that the 
non-identity problem only arises in unrealistic, “fact-insensitive” 
thought experiments; in the real world, where climate change is 
an urgent problem, the non-identity effect of our policy choices is 
“insignificant” (2018: 44) and can be safely ignored. Here I devel-
op a difference-making approach for thinking about the signifi-
cance of such effects and subsequently argue that the non-identity 
effects of climate policy are indeed significant. If one wishes to 
avoid the non-identity problem, one will have to tackle it head 
on.
The non-identity effect
In what follows, it will help to distinguish the non-identity prob-
lem itself from what I call, following Broome (2012: 62), the 
non-identity effect. A choice has a non-identity effect if it makes 
a difference to who subsequently comes to exist. Choosing to 
have one child rather than none has a non-identity effect, as does 
choosing to have a child with one mate rather than another or 
even with the same mate at a different time. 
The non-identity problem, on the other hand, arises when a choice 
strikes us as morally objectionable, on account of its effects on 
some person, even though (due to its non-identity effect) that 
A choice has a non-identity effect if it makes a difference 
to who subsequently comes to exist. The non-identity 
problem, on the other hand, arises when a choice strikes 
us as morally objectionable, on account of its effects 
on some person, even though (due to its non-identity 
effect) that very person would never exist if the choice 
went another way.
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very person would never exist if the choice went another way. 
For instance,
Zika. A couple living in a region where Zika virus is circulat-
ing wishes to have a child. Their doctor advises them to wait a 
month before conceiving, by which time the risk of infection 
will have passed. But they are in a hurry and conceive forth-
with. The woman is then bitten by a Zika-carrying mosquito; 
the infection is transmitted to the foetus; the child is born 
with microcephaly and has reduced quality of life as a result. 
Was their choice to conceive forthwith morally objectionable? 
One tends to think so. That is not to say their choice was wrong, 
all things considered; perhaps they had good reason not to delay. 
Still, they had a moral reason to delay, and presumably that reason 
had to do with the welfare of their child. Their child would have 
had a better life, one supposes, had they elected to wait.
The problem, of course, is that it would have been a different 
child having that better life. Had they waited, their actual child 
would never exist at all. That child is no worse off than she would 
have been had they waited, because her existence, however im-
paired, is not worse than no existence at all.1 Nor has that child 
been harmed, if harming someone requires making her worse off. 
Consequently, it is difficult to explain what our objection to the 
couple’s choice might be. 
But the non-identity effect is not restricted to procreative choic-
es, as Parfit (1976) first pointed out. Indirectly, socio-economic 
policies have non-identity effects as well, by affecting our lives in 
countless ways – where and how we live, work, study, play – there-
by affecting whether, when, and with whom we have children. 
Which brings us back to the subject of climate change. Climate 
change is, as Gardiner (2006) puts it, a severely time-lagged phe-
nomenon, the effects of which are heavily backloaded. The chang-
es we see now – and the consequent casualties2 – result from CO2 
emissions accumulated over the last two centuries. The impact of 
current and future emissions, on the other hand, will be felt some 
time (and, due to the long residence of CO2 in the atmosphere, 
for a long time) in the future. Most of those impacts will fall on 
people not yet born.
Based on current projections, furthermore, the impacts are ex-
pected to be disastrous. Absent significant mitigation,3 the Inter-
governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) projects global 
mean surface temperature will rise 3.7°C to 4.8°C over preindus-
A
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A second attempt to evade the non-identity problem 
might point out that the negative effects of climate 
change are not deferred as far into the future as scien-
tists used to think. Let us grant that we owe it to our 
existing children to mitigate climate change. Still, the 
non-identity problem is not a moot point as it bears on 
the need to weigh the costs and benefits of mitigating 
climate change against those of adapting to it.
trial levels by 2100.4 Warming of that magnitude would bring 
“high to very high risk of severe, wide-spread and irreversible im-
pacts globally” (IPCC 2014a: 19), including the loss of species 
and ecosystems, extreme weather events, significant and irreversi-
ble sea-level rise, and, for humans, increased food and water inse-
curity, disease, dislocation, conflict, and poverty.5 The good news 
is that it is still possible to reduce climate change risks through 
concerted efforts at mitigation (IPCC 2014c:14). The bad news 
is that doing so will be extremely expensive; no doubt many other 
projects and opportunities would have to be sacrificed.6
Hence the question: do we owe it to future people, as a require-
ment of justice, to act now to prevent these bad effects from 
 occurring? Many think so.7 But now we must confront the non-
iden tity problem. Since the choice to mitigate climate change 
(or not) will affect who later exists, we cannot claim that future 
people will be individually better off if we reduce our emissions. 
Other  future people would enjoy a more stable climate and better 
living conditions if we reduce emissions, but not the same future 
people.8 Nor will future individuals be able to claim, if we fail to 
mitigate climate change, that they had a right to inherit a better 
world, for we could not have left those future people a better world 
(Broome 2012: 62). How then can it be maintained that we have 
an  obligation to future people to act?
It seems, therefore, that the non-identity problem has the po-
tential to undermine justice-based arguments for mitigation. For 
similar reasons, it may undermine arguments of historic justice 
that inhabitants of industrialised countries, having benefited from 
past industrialisation, ought now to bear the burdens of mitigat-
ing and adapting to climate change. Thanks to the non-identity 
effect, however, it is not true that inhabitants of industrialised 
countries are better off than they would have been had industri-
alisation not occurred; without industrialisation, those individuals 
would not exist (Caney 2005: 757-758).
Can we dodge the problem?
Thus far, we have seen that the non-identity problem has the po-
tential to undermine two familiar arguments about climate jus-
tice. Of course, if it could be shown that the non-identity prob-
lem rested on some error, those arguments might hold up rather 
well. I shall return to that possibility below. First, though, I would 
like to consider three attempts to sidestep the non-identity prob-
lem by arguing that its implications for policy in this area are 
quite limited. 
One way to evade the non-identity problem would be to appeal 
to moral obligations which are not duties of justice. According 
to Broome (2012: 52-53), duties of justice are owed to particular 
people, whereas duties of goodness are owed to no one in par-
ticular. Our governments, furthermore, have a general obligation 
of goodness “to promote the flourishing of their people” (65), 
giving them a reason, quite apart from justice, to mitigate climate 
change. However, shifting our focus from justice to beneficence 
does not render the non-identity problem moot. First, when jus-
tice and beneficence conflict, justice usually takes priority. If we 
owe it to current people to help them adapt to climate change, 
the idea of mitigating climate change in order to promote future 
flourishing would have to take a backseat; whereas if we owe it 
to future people to mitigate climate change as a duty of justice, 
their claim may win out. Furthermore, our governments are apt 
to interpret the duty to promote the flourishing of “their people” 
rather narrowly, to include only those who might vote for them 
in the next election. Promoting the good of future people, while 
nice, seems supererogatory – unless, of course, one owes them 
something as a duty of justice. 
A second attempt to evade the non-identity problem might point 
out that the negative effects of climate change are not deferred as 
far into the future as scientists used to think. Climate change is 
already killing people and will almost certainly make life increas-
ingly miserable for a great many who already exist.9 Today’s chil-
dren, after all, can reasonably expect to see the year 2100, which 
is the endpoint for most IPCC projections. Since those children 
already exist, our duty to mitigate climate change for their sake 
is not undermined by the non-identity effect, which only affects 
duties to future people.
Let us grant that we owe it to our existing children to mitigate 
 climate change. Still, the non-identity problem is not a moot 
point as it bears on the need to weigh the costs and benefits of 
mitigating climate change against those of adapting to it. As 
 Moellendorf (2015: 174) observes, adaptation policies can  benefit 
those alive now as well as future people, whereas mitigation most-
ly benefits future generations – unless, that is, the non-identity 
effect means that we cannot benefit future people at all. And if 
mitigation would benefit practically no one, surely we ought to 
direct our  resources toward adaptation instead. So, even if we have 
ample reason to worry about climate change for the sake of cur-
rent  people, the non-identity effect still has implications for the 
appropriate policy response. 
Is the effect insignificant?
A third and I think more interesting reason why the non-identity 
effect might be irrelevant to climate policy is suggested by Trem-
mel (2018). As he sees it, the non-identity effect only matters in 
unrealistic, “fact-insensitive” thought experiments where the caus-
al factors at play are artificially expanded. In the real world, where 
climate change is an urgent problem, the non-identity effect of 
policy choice is “miniscule” and “insignificant” (44) and can be 
safely ignored.
Why insignificant? As Tremmel points out, government policies 
aimed at controlling emissions aren’t the only factors affecting 
whether, when, and with whom people make babies – far from 
it. A myriad factors play a role: college admission policies, dating 
apps, and the closing times of bars play, in his view, just as big 
a role (2018: 46), to say nothing of such things as trade policy, 
tax incentives, housing prices, war, financial deregulation, and on 
and on. But the more factors there are, the less any one seems to 
matter: “If the number of factors that influence who will be meet-
ing, mating and making children with whom converges toward 
infinity, the influence of each particular factor converges towards 
zero” (46).
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Let us grant that a great many factors affect who later comes into 
existence. It does not follow, however, that the effect of any one 
such factor is small or insignificant. We can see this from classical 
physics. According to Newton’s laws, the acceleration a particle 
undergoes depends on its mass and on the force applied to it, and 
every particle with mass exerts some gravitational force on every 
other. Thus, the number of factors influencing the motion of any 
one is potentially infinite. Does it follow that the influence of each 
must approach zero? No. Since gravitational force is proportional 
to mass and inversely proportional to the square of distance, the 
influence of nearby, massive particles is bound to be significant by 
comparison to the rest, no matter how many there are.
While that suggests that Tremmel’s argument is unsound, classical 
physics is a poor model for the non-identity effect. Physical forc-
es obey Mill’s (1858) principle of the composition of causes: the 
result of two forces is just the sum of each were it acting alone. 
Consequently, we can ask “How much of A’s acceleration is due to 
B?”, because force is a quantity, and quantities can be aggregated. 
It’s like asking how much of one’s martini is gin and how much 
vermouth; forces, like spirits, can be aggregated. 
But the non-identity effect does not work that way. The question 
“How much of the population of the future is due to climate pol-
icy?” makes little sense, because policies don’t contribute discrete 
sets of individuals; nor do dating apps, bar times, or banking reg-
ulations. We cannot coherently ask who would exist in the future 
if climate policy (or dating apps, etc.) were the only “force” at 
work, for such a situation is inconceivable. 
So, Tremmel’s attempt to sidestep the non-identity problem 
seems unworkable, but the analogy with physics suggests a new 
question: how should we think about the contributions of differ-
ent identity-affecting factors? 
A difference-making account of causal significance
For our purposes, a better model than physics is biology. Some-
times we want to ask whether a given trait, e.g. height, depends 
more on the organism’s genes than on its environment. But we do 
not suppose that genes and environment make separate contribu-
tions which can be aggregated like forces (Sober 1988). It makes 
no sense to ask how tall someone would have been if genes had 
acted alone, or if environment had acted alone. Genes cannot act 
without environment, nor environment without genes; both are 
required for phenotypic effects (Ariew 1996). 
Still, there are ways to compare the effects of genetic and environ-
mental factors. One way is to ask, of a trait in a given population, 
whether genes or environment make more of a difference. That is 
the intuitive idea behind the statistical technique known as anal-
ysis of variance (ANOVA). To illustrate briefly, suppose we have a 
number of plant seedlings representing three genotypes (G1, G2, 
G3) of the same species.10 We plant them in separate plots, vary-
ing only the amount of water they receive (low, medium, high). 
We then measure their heights at maturity, average them, and plot 
as a function of the other two variables, as in Table 1.
The variance, intuitively, is the extent to which the values in the 
nine cells differ from the grand mean. The question ANOVA an-
swers is: which variable accounts for more of the variance? (In this 
case, the answer is W.)
Four points about the statistical analysis of variance are relevant 
to our discussion. First, which factor accounts for more of the 
variance is relative to a population. In this population, W’s value 
makes a bigger difference to height than G’s. In a population con-
taining other variants (say, G3, G4, and G5), G(enotype) might 
account for more variance than W(ater). 
Second, statistical difference-making is contrastive. The difference 
a given value of G (say, G1) makes to H depends on what other 
value(s) of G we contrast it with, or what we take as the “base-
line”. G’s being G1 rather than G2 makes a difference of 5 units, 
whereas G’s being G1 rather than G3 makes a value of 10 units. 
So, our choice of contrast matters.
Third, nothing here turns on how many different factors are at 
play. Presumably, a myriad of factors, both environmental and 
genetic, influence height; even so, it would not follow that water’s 
effect on height is insignificant (though we might find it to be so 
in some populations).
Fourth, ANOVA is a population-level analysis, inapplicable to a 
singleton case. In a population of one, there is no variance to ana-
lyse. And that is a problem for us, because in non-identity cases, 
we really are dealing with a population of one – not of one person, 
necessarily, but a population of one population. There is only one 
human population, and we are wondering about the effect climate 
policy has on its composition. If we had a bunch of populations, 
all genetically identical, we could “plant” them (so to speak) and 
subject them to various manipulations. But we do not.
Still, we can pretend. Imagine, as a variant on Putnam’s (1975) 
Twin Earth case, that we had the god-like power to make hun-
dreds of Twin Earths, each a molecule-for-molecule duplicate of 
the Earth as it is right now, right down to the DNA molecules 
of all 7 billion of us. Then we divide the many Twin Earths into 
distinct lots, subjecting each lot to a distinct set of manipulations. 
Some  Twin Earths we subject to a mix of policies aimed at keep-
ing warming by 2100 below 1.5°C; others we subject to a mix of 
policies aimed at keeping warming below 2°C; others receive no 
additional mitigation. We can manipulate other factors as well, 
e.g., bar times. Then, at various points in the future (say, 30-year 
intervals), we check to see if the “same people” (genetic twins) are 
born.11
Obviously, we cannot do any of these things, except in thought, 
which brings me to a fifth point. 
In the singleton case, the relevant notion of difference-making is 
not statistical; it is counterfactual (Sober 1988). To what extent 
is Giorgione’s height due to his environment? The only way I can 
see to answer that question is with a counterfactual: to the extent 
that his height would have been different had he the same genes but 
been raised in a different environment. As with statistical differ-
  W=High W=Medium W=Low Marginal average
 G1 85 55 25 55
 G2 80 50 20 50
 G3 75 45 15 45
Marginal  80 50 20 
average    
     Grande mean = 50
Table 1: Fictional data for plant heights and water-breed  
combinations 
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ence-making, furthermore, counterfactual difference-making is 
contrastive: that is, we must specify in what other environment(s) 
Giorgione would have been raised if not his actual. If he was 
raised in a high-nutrition environment, the interesting contrast 
might be a low-nutrition environment, in which case (perhaps) 
he would have been far shorter; then his environment made the 
difference. Or perhaps he would have been just as tall, in which 
case his environment made little difference. Whichever the case, 
contrastivity seems unavoidable.
Why the non-identity effect of climate policy is significant
Now, I suggest that we frame our question about the non-identity 
effect of climate policy in the same terms. Consider the most am-
bitious goal set forth in the 2015 Paris Agreement, that of limiting 
the increase in global average temperature to no more than 1.5°C, 
and suppose that we have some idea of the policy regime (a mix 
of carbon taxes, infrastructure investments, and so on) needed 
to achieve it. How significant would the non-identity effect be? 
What difference would it make to “the phonebook of the future” 
(in Tremmel’s apt metaphor)?
It depends, I submit, on what policy(s) we select as the alternative. 
One alternative is the “business as usual” or “baseline” scenario 
involving no mitigation measures beyond those in place; another 
is the slightly less ambitious goal highlighted in the Paris Agree-
ment of holding warming by 2100 below 2°C. While 0.5°C does 
not sound like much difference, IPCC (2018) finds major differ-
ences in what it would take to achieve them. Based on current 
models, the 2°C goal would require emissions to decline 25% by 
2030 and reach net zero by 2070, whereas 1.5°C would require 
emissions to decline 45% by 2030 and reach net zero by 2050. As 
IPCC (2018: 15) puts it, in comparison to 2°C, limiting warm-
ing to 1.5°C “would require rapid and far-reaching transitions in 
energy, land, urban and infrastructure (including transport and 
buildings), and industrial systems” on an unprecedented scale and 
“imply deep emissions reductions in all sectors, a wide portfolio 
of mitigation options and a significant upscaling of investments 
in those options”.12
Now, the first point I want to make is that the difference between 
these “rapid and far-reaching transitions” required for 1.5°C and 
the somewhat less rapid but still far-reaching transitions required 
for the 2°C goal would make one sort of difference to future pop-
ulation. By contrast, the difference between the 1.5°C scenario 
and the baseline would be quite another. Of course, we cannot say 
exactly how much the future population would differ in either 
case, much less which individuals would exist. But there is rea-
son to think that, compared to a policy of business-as-usual, the 
adoption of policies consistent with 1.5°C of warming would sig-
nificantly alter the details of most people’s lives. If so, their future 
populations would in all likelihood diverge rapidly, with entirely 
different people being born in fairly short order.
There are several reasons to expect rapid divergence. First, econ-
omists agree that any serious attempt to reduce emissions would 
require putting a price on carbon emissions; the steeper the target 
reduction, the higher the price would have to be initially and the 
more rapidly it would have to increase. Under a less ambitious tar-
get, we might limit the impact of carbon pricing on people’s lives 
by rebating some or all of the revenues back to taxpayers, or by 
using it to address poverty. But if we need to reduce emissions by 
45% by 2030 and reach net zero by 2050, it’s plausible that most 
if not all of the revenue would have to flow towards infrastructure, 
research and development. Compared to baseline, therefore, those 
in a 1.5°C world would for all intents and purposes live in vastly 
different economies; they would attend different schools, enter 
different careers, live in different places, travel by different means, 
and meet different people, all of which would subtly affect the 
timings of conceptions.
A further difference between the baseline and 1.5°C target scenar-
ios involves climate change itself, which has add-on non-identity 
effects. Under the 1.5°C target, the climate will warm less rapidly 
and less overall compared to baseline, reducing both risk and 
the cost of adaptation in decades to come. There would be many 
fewer climate refugees than under baseline. These differences 
would further affect people’s lives and indirectly their procreative 
choices. 
A third difference between the baseline and 1.5°C target scenarios 
involves social unrest. We have already seen, in the Yellow Jacket 
movement in France, how one country’s quite modest attempts 
to curtail emissions by raising fuel taxes can lead to unrest, and 
unrest has non-identity effects of its own. Unrest brings protesters 
together, but it can also drive neighbours apart. It brings some 
into the street while leading others to stay home, all of which 
affects who meets and ultimately mates with whom and when. 
Under the baseline scenario, too, we should expect social unrest, 
though in different communities and with different results. Un-
der baseline, the protesters would be primarily young people and 
progressives (in affluent countries in the Global North); under 
1.5°C, the protesters are more likely to be older middle-class men 
unhappy with the added cost of living.
A fourth difference between baseline and 1.5°C scenarios is a dif-
ference in our values. Barring technological miracles, rapid decar-
bonisation may not be achievable in capitalist democracies, where 
economic growth is normative, multinational corporations hold 
immense power, economic inequality runs high, and the accumu-
lation of wealth and material goods are employed as the measure 
of a life. To rapidly transform society, therefore, we likely must si-
multaneously transform our media, our schools, our politics, and 
our values. And since values guide choices, our children will likely 
make different procreative choices, compared to baseline, in part 
because of their different values. 
Compared to baseline, therefore, one should expect the adoption 
of policies aimed at 1.5°C of warming to have a large non-identity 
effect; due to the far-reaching changes needed in society, quite 
possibly no one’s life would be quite the same. In terms of the 
analogy to classical physics from above, adopting such policies 
would be like adding a distant but extremely massive object to our 
solar system: the effect on other bodies would be relatively indi-
In the singleton case, the relevant notion of differ-
ence-making is not statistical; it is counterfactual. 
Whichever the case, contrastivity seems unavoidable.
Barring technological miracles, rapid decarbonisation 
may not be achievable in capitalist democracies, 
where economic growth is normative, multinational 
 corporations hold immense power, economic inequality 
runs high, and the accumulation of wealth and material 
goods are employed as the measure of a life.
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rect, but it would subtly affect the trajectories of them all. Com-
pared on the other hand to policies aimed at 2°C, the non-iden-
tity effect of 1.5°C would be smaller but still, due to the shorter 
time to reach net zero, quite pronounced. 
The outlook
In this paper, I have argued that we cannot avoid the non-iden-
tity problem in climate ethics by supposing that the non-iden-
tity effects of our various policy options would be insignificant 
or otherwise beside the point. Hence, if we are persuaded that 
unmitigated CO2 emissions would do future people an injustice, 
we must attack the problem head on: we shall have to show that 
an act can harm or otherwise wrong someone who would never 
exist but for that very act.
 While I lack the space to defend such an approach, I shall 
briefly argue that one of the assumptions underlying the problem 
is quite vulnerable and suggest an improvement. This is the as-
sumption that an act cannot harm someone if it does not make her 
worse off than she would otherwise have been. Although there is a 
connection between harming and counterfactual difference-mak-
ing, it is not as simple as the italicised formula would indicate. We 
can see this by considering a different thought experiment, one 
involving causal preemption:
Thirsty Traveller. A traveller, T, sets out on a trip across the desert. 
T has two enemies, A and B. A puts a deadly poison in T’s reserve 
can of drinking water. Then B, unaware of the poison, drills a hole 
in the bottom of the can. By the time T needs the reserve, the can 
is dry; T dies in the desert.13
In this case, someone harmed T, and it certainly wasn’t A. After 
all, A’s poison never touches T’s lips; his attempt on T’s life is cut 
short. We can agree that A wronged T by trying to harm him, but 
it also seems clear that B wrongs T in a more direct sense – by 
actually harming him. And if B harms T, then harming someone 
cannot require making that person worse off. For in this case, T 
winds up no worse off than he would have been if B hadn’t drilled 
his little hole (Bontly 2016: 1237).
 Preemption cases suggest that we need to rethink the coun-
terfactual account of harm. As a first pass, consider a simple 
(though ultimately inadequate) causal account of harm, where an 
action harms someone if it actually causes something to occur 
that is worse for that person, i.e. if it produces an effect that per-
son would be better off without. In Thirsty Traveller, due to the 
preempted backup, B’s drilling the hole does not make T worse 
off than T would otherwise have been. However, B’s drilling does 
cause something – viz. T’s death – which leaves T worse off than 
he would otherwise have been. Insofar as preemptive harms are 
concerned, thus, the simple causal account appears to improve 
upon the familiar counterfactual account of harm.
 Similarly, in the case of climate change, the simple causal ac-
count appears to vindicate the commonsense view that our choi-
ces can harm future people, even those who would never exist 
but for those choices. To keep things manageable, let us focus on 
a dichotomous choice: either to pursue mitigation policies suffi-
cient to limit warming to 1.5°C (henceforth, “Mitigation”), or 
to continue our reliance upon fossil fuels without any attempt to 
mitigate (“Baseline”). Suppose now that we choose Baseline, ex-
treme warming ensues as predicted, and millions of people in the 
22nd century suffer or die prematurely from climate-related causes. 
Let us assume, furthermore, that none of these millions of people 
would ever exist if we chose Mitigation, due to the non-identity 
effect, though other people would. A simple counterfactual theory 
of harm tells us, counterintuitively, that Baseline does not harm 
those future people, for they themselves are no worse off than 
they would be under Mitigation. The causal account, on the other 
hand, says just the opposite: our choice harms the future people, 
because it causes extreme warming, which is worse for them than 
the lesser warming under Mitigation would have been.
 So, a causal account of harm can explain why there is at least 
a pro tanto objection to the Baseline choice, that is, why it is ob-
jectionable in some respect or to some extent. By that same to-
ken, however, it may seem on a causal account that the pro tanto 
objection is overridden by a greater benefit we give to those same 
people: namely, the benefit of existence. For we may assume that 
existence is on balance good for these future people – that the 
good they experience in their lifetimes outweighs the bad, despite 
the ill effects of unmitigated climate change. And, of course, these 
future people would receive none of these benefits if we had not 
chosen Baseline, for then they would not exist at all. Thus, it can 
be argued that, on a causal account, our choice benefits the fu-
ture people more than it harms them, leaving it unclear why that 
choice is objectionable, all things considered.
 However, a subtle amendment to the causal account solves 
the problem. On the view I favour, harming and benefiting are 
not just causal notions; they are contrastive notions. That is, the 
claim that some action, x, harms a particular person must be un-
derstood as the claim that the performance of x rather than some 
specific alternative(s) x* harms that person, where x* is the act (or 
set of acts) the agent would or might have done instead. Then the 
contrastive account of harming (and benefiting) runs as follows:
The performance of x rather than x* harms (benefits) someone, S, 
if and only if (i) there are events e and e* such that x rather than 
x* causes e rather than e*, and (ii) e is worse (better) for S than e* 
would have been (Bontly 2016: 1246-1247).
Now consider the choice between Baseline and Mitigation. Just 
let e be extreme warming of (say) 4°C or more, and let e* be 
warming of only 1.5°C. By hypothesis, 4°C is worse for those 
people than 1.5°C would be, and Baseline rather than Mitigation 
causes warming of 4°C rather than 1.5°C. So, our choice does 
indeed harm the future people.
Furthermore, there is no reason, on the contrastive account, to 
think that our choice benefits the future people in causing them 
to exist. For it to benefit them, there would have to be some e and 
e* such that (i) Baseline rather than Mitigation causes e rather 
than e*, and (ii) e is better for the future people than e* would 
have been. One can easily find pairs of events that satisfy one 
constraint or the other, but no events in our scenario seem to 
satisfy both conditions simultaneously. For instance, our choos-
ing Baseline over Mitigation causes one group of future people to 
come to exist rather than another. But is it better for these future 
people that they exist rather than some other future people? No. 
A person isn’t better off in worlds where she exists than in worlds 
where she never exists at all. Nor is she worse off or equally well 
off. Such comparisons presuppose that the person has a welfare in 
both worlds, and that presupposition is not satisfied in this case.
On the other hand, assuming that our future people have lives 
that are on balance good ones, there must surely be events in their 
lives which satisfy (ii). The question is whether our choice causes 
such events to occur rather than alternatives that would be worse 
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for them. Suppose that one of these future people is a faculty 
member, and that her receiving tenure is better for her than her 
being denied tenure would have been. But choosing Baseline over 
Mitigation does not cause our future professor to receive tenure 
rather than to be denied tenure, nor does it clearly cause her to 
have any other good rather than to lack it (Bontly 2016). 
These claims require further defence than given here, but I am 
hopeful that a contrastive account of harm will deliver us from 
the non-identity problem. 
Notes
1 Nor, presumably, is their actual child better off than she would 
have been had they waited. A person is better off in scenario A 
than in scenario B only if her wellbeing in A would be higher than 
in B. Since a person has no wellbeing in worlds where she has no 
being, one cannot (I conclude) be better or worse off than if one 
never existed. For a contrasting view, see Roberts (2003).
2 Estimates of deaths from climate change vary. One oft-cited 
number comes from the World Health Organization (2009: 24), 
which estimated that climate change was already responsible for 
140,000 excess deaths annually by the year 2004.
3 “Mitigation” in this context refers to reducing CO2 emissions 
or enhancing CO2 sinks in order to stabilise the climate; “adapta-
tion” means reducing human vulnerability to risks from a chang-
ing climate. 
4 The range of 3.7°C to 4.8°C assumes a median estimate of cli-
mate sensitivity to increased levels of greenhouse gas. The possible 
range is reported to be 2.5°C to 7.8°C (IPCC 2014a: 8).
5 These and other risks are detailed in IPCC 2014c, especially 
Part B (“Future Risks and Opportunities for Adaptation”).
6 Estimates of the cost of mitigating climate change depend partly 
on how much warming we are willing to accept. According to the 
IPCC (2018), limiting warming by 2100 to 1.5°C is apt to be 
considerably more costly than limiting warming to 2°C; on the 
other hand, adapting to 1.5°C is apt to considerably less costly 
than adapting to 2°C. Much controversy surrounds attempts to 
calculate costs and benefits of climate change; see Broome (2012), 
especially Chapters 3, 8, and 9, and the references given therein.
7 See, for instance, most of the papers in Moore and Nelson (2010). 
In their introduction to the volume, Moore and Nelson write “[w]
e have a moral obligation to avert harms to the future, so as to leave 
a world as rich in life and possibility as the world we inherited.”
8 Arguably, there are some future people, especially in the near 
future, who would exist whether we mitigate climate or not, for 
the non-identity effect is time-lagged (Parfit 1976: 102). How-
ever, those people are unlikely to benefit much from mitigation, 
because the effects thereof (in terms of avoided warming) are also 
time-lagged (USGCRP 2017: 394). Tebaldi and Friedlingstein 
(2013) find that it would take 25–30 years for the effects of miti-
gation to become discernible. Likewise, the IPCC (2014b: 9) pro-
jects a similar increase in global temperature across all emission 
scenarios over the next few decades. It is plausible, therefore, that 
the time-lags of non-identity and mitigation would approximate-
ly offset. I thank an anonymous referee for raising the issue. 
9 For instance, the World Health Organization estimates that 
global warming would contribute an additional 250,000 deaths 
annually by 2030 (Hales et al. 2014). 
10 The example is borrowed from Northcott (2008), who adapted 
it from Lewontin (1974).
11 One interesting question we might ask is whether Twin Earths 
in the same “treatment group” (i.e. the same cell in the table, sub-
jected to the same settings of the various exogenous variables) wind 
up with the “same” individuals (i.e. twins) being born? To put it 
another way, how much of the variance is due to random chance, or 
factors for which we cannot control? Perhaps quite a bit. 
12 More precisely, these are the requirements to keep the tem-
perature increase below 1.5°C “without overshoot”. IPCC (2018) 
also explores pathways where we temporarily exceed 1.5°C above 
preindustrial average and then draw down by means which are 
technically possible but currently unavailable.
13 Thirsty Traveller is adapted from Mackie (1974: 44), who 
 offers it as a counterexample to a simple counterfactual account 
of causation.
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